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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
privacy theory would require the theoretical complications discussed above and
would involve extension of the right of privacy to areas not within its usual scope,
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §97 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEmENT, TORT §867
(1939). Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193
(1890), the New York defamation theory would seem a more desirable basis for
relief. But either approach is to be preferred to the Georgia court's flat rejection
of recovery without regard to the validity of the asserted claim, or even the
reasonableness of the creditor's belief in its validity.
James Magavern
Meaning of the Concept of. Exclusive Control In Res Ipsa Loquitur Cases
The decedent, while attending the New York State School for the Blind, died
of burns received while attempting to take a bath. There were no witnesses
present when the accident occurred and the cause of the accident was not
"established at the trial. The Court held that this was a proper case of the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Minotti v. The State of New York, 166 N.Y.S.2d
396 (Ct. C. 1957).
When res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the specific acts of negligence do not
have to be proven for the doctrine establishes an inference which permits the
jury to find negligence. Foltis v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455
(1951). New York accepts the view that res ipsa loquitur is nothing more than
a rule of circumstantial evidence. Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 196 N.E. 36
(1935). But for the theory that res ipsa loquitur is something more, that is, to
allow the jury to find negligence where there is some probability, even though
the probability is 50-50, or less; see: Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1
BUFFALO L REv. 1 (1951).
Even when used as a rule of circumstantial evidence what requirements must
be met before the doctrine may be invoked? The general view is that damage
must be of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence
and that it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant. WIGMoR, EVIDENCE §2509 (3d ed. 1940) New York
claims to follow this view and verbally, at least, requires exclusive control by
the defendant in order to apply the res ipsa doctrine. Silverberg v. Schweig, 288
N.Y. 217, 42 N.E.2d (1942).
However this writer questions whether the court has not relaxed in
application the stringent requirement of exclusive control. It is suggested that
an example of this relaxation may be seen by comparing the foliowing cases:
In Sasso v. Randforce Amusement Corporation, 243 App. Div. 552, 275 N.Y.
Supp. 891 (2d Dep't 1934) the plaintiff was injured when the theater seat on
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which she was sitting collapsed. The court held that res ipsa loquitur applied.
Subsequently in Nabson v. Mordall Realty Corporation, 257 App. Div. 659, 15
N.Y.S. 2d 38 (1st Dep't 1939) the court held that the doctrine was not applicable
in a case where the plaintiff received an injury by a splinter from a theater seat.
Is it not true that in both cases the defendant had the same amount of control?
The court distinguished the cases by saying:
The instrumentality which produced the accident must be within the
exclusive possession and control of the person charged with negligence.
Where a defendant has such control and has exclusive knowledge of the
care exercised in the control and management of the instrumentality,
-evidence of circumstances which show that the accident would not
ordinarily have occurred without neglect of some duty owed to the
plaintiff is sufficient to justify the inference of negligence. . . . In the
present case the elements which must be present before the rule of Res
Ipsa Loquitur is invoked were not shown to exist. Assuming that
control of the seat might be held sufficiently exclusive if the accident
occurred from some structural defect, it should not be so held as to a
minor lack of repair that might have been developed a few minutes
before the plaintiffs injury from casual use of the seat by a patron.
The least these cases do is to dearly point to the conclusion that control is an
ambiguous concept. However, this writer believes that the two cases can be
rationalized on the basis of their respective probabilities. In the Nabson case it
was just as probable that the injury was caused by another's negligence while in
the' Sasso case, although the instrumentality was subject to dual control, the
defendant's negligence is more probable because of the nature of the defect.
However, in the Nabson case the nature of the defect was such that the injury may
be reasonably attributable to the negligent or non-negligent acts of a number
of persons. Cf. Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BUFFALO L. REv. 1, 6, n. 13
(1951).
In the instant case the defendant did not have exclusive control of the
instrumentality causing the injury. The decedent was trained to take a bath
without aid and can be held to the same standard of care as an ordinary prudent
man under the circumstances of being blind. Hill v. City of Glenwood, 124 Iowa
479, 100 N.W. 522 (1904). He, not the state via its agents, had exclusive control
of the faucets. Furthermore the probability that the defendant was negligent is
no greater than the probability that the decedent was negligent.
Thus the writer is of the opinion that res ipsa loquitur cannot be used to aid
the plaintiff whether the strict requirement of exclusive control is followed or a
more liberal test of probability. Whichever test is applied the necessary elements
are not present.
Morton H. Levy
